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An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American
Foreign Policy. By Betty Glad. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009. ISBN 9780801448157.

In her book An Outsider in the White House, Betty Glad opens with the question, “What
happens when an outsider with lofty moral and political goals and little experience or education
in foreign policy takes over the U.S. presidency?” (1). President Jimmy Carter’s solution, she
responds, was to lean on his staff in order to formulate and execute foreign policy. As a result,
his advisors exercised undue influence over international affairs and ultimately hijacked his
original global policy. In addition, Glad describes the internal rivalries that existed within the
Carter administration’s foreign policy team, specifically focusing on the differences between
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Glad
concludes that Brzezinski’s ultimate victory in this power struggle further caused the
administration’s diplomatic agenda to shift over the course of Carter’s four years in office.
Glad elaborates upon this argument throughout the book’s six parts. The first third of the
monograph, for instance, shows Carter’s initial policy goals and Brzezinski’s moves to
consolidate power over his rivals within the administration, through the midterm election cycle
in 1978. Indeed, Carter allowed Brzezinski extensive authority over foreign affairs before the
administration entered office. Most of this power was granted through review of Presidential
Review Memoranda and other reports (30-1). Additionally, the organizational structure in place
ensured that Brzezinski had the greatest access to Carter. Since Carter lacked a chief of staff for
the first three years of his term (9), Brzezinski was able to reach the president whenever he
pleased without interference from another individual, thus acquiring an opportunity to exploit
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the system and Carter’s lack of foreign policy experience. Finally, the section describes
Carter’s broad foreign policy objectives. In Carter’s first days in the Oval Office, he wanted to
press human rights as an international issue and oversee substantial nuclear arms reduction (54).
Glad notes, however, that Carter abandoned these goals shortly into his term, due in part to
Brzezinski’s influence.
The third and fourth parts of Glad’s book trace the failed efforts of Vance and others in
the administration to exert influence over policymaking. The third section, for instance, begins
with Brzezinski’s push for greater relations with China. Although Vance disagreed and
believed that increased diplomacy with China might harm future talks with the Soviet Union
(120), the persistent Brzezinski was able to persuade Carter, due “not only [to] institutional and
political considerations but psychological factors as well” (138). Brzezinski was successful
over his counterparts because he made Carter feel as though he were acting “tough” (139), and
Glad notes that Brzezinski repetitively fell back to this strategy when trying to influence Carter.
In her view, Brzezinski continued to outmaneuver his internal rivals because of the
organizational structure in place and Brzezinski’s ability to say what the President wanted to
hear.
These two parts are perhaps the most intriguing portion of the work. Brzezinski entered
1979 as Carter’s primary foreign policy advisor, despite his minor role in Carter’s two “very
real successes [Panama Canal and Camp David] (3). Indeed, Carter’s greatest foreign policy
success, the Camp David Accords, came when he personally took the lead. In contrast, the
many issues on which Brzezinski took the initiative did not yield the same successes as those
where Carter led and utilized his entire administration. Nonetheless, the president still
abandoned the organizational structure that brought him success, in favor of a Brzezinski-
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centric structure that had no major successes to its credit. The reader must wonder whether
Carter recognized what had led to success at Camp David and whether by late 1978, Carter
understood how to run the White House.
The final two parts discuss Brzezinski’s absolute leverage over foreign policy during the
final years of the Carter presidency. In July 1980, Carter, who once supported nuclear
reduction, signed Presidential Directive 59 (PD 59) which affirmed the administration’s belief
that a strong nuclear program was necessary for American security needs (219). PD 59 was
direct evidence that the assertive Brzezinski foreign policy was now the policy of the entire
administration. With Brzezinski at the helm, Carter also dropped the human rights stance with
which he entered office, choosing to ignore human rights violators for the sake of geopolitical
considerations. Consequently, the Carter administration that entered office championing human
rights found itself voting in the United Nations to allow Pol Pot’s regime to continue its
representation of Cambodia in the organization (238).
This final part demonstrates a paradox within Carter’s foreign policy goals. Carter
wanted others to view him as strong and tough in foreign politics. Brzezinski, however, was
able to exploit Carter’s desires and become more powerful than his boss in the realm of foreign
policy. Carter’s hopes to be perceived as tough to external powers, then, actually weakened him
within his own administration. This paradox led to many of the administration’s foreign policy
short-comings, and Brzezinski’s ability to outmaneuver Carter ultimately helped to seal the
latter’s presidential legacy. Through Glad’s analyses, though, the reader is given the chance to
formulate his or her own opinions on Carter’s time in office. On one hand, the reader can feel
sympathy for Carter and argue that Carter was exploited by Brzezinski. The reader could also
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place the blame directly on Carter for not being a competent executive and argue that Carter
should have recognized Brzezinski’s position and not allowed him to gain so much influence.
Regardless of the reader’s opinion, Glad still establishes that there was a stark contrast
between how Carter wanted to be perceived in the international community and how he was
within his own administration.
Glad’s work is an in-depth account of the internal workings of Jimmy Carter’s foreign
policy staff that successfully illustrates how Carter’s international objectives changed as a
result of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s ability to exploit Carter’s inexperience and hijack his
diplomatic agenda. The book further makes the reader question whether Carter was at fault for
Brzezinski’s ability to change the administration’s foreign policy agenda or if Carter was a
victim within his own administration to an over-ambitious National Security Advisor. The
reader’s answer to this critical question provides a frame for their view of Jimmy Carter’s time
in office.
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